Maryland Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 2

Article 7

Recent Decisions

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Recommended Citation
Recent Decisions, 25 Md. L. Rev. 182 (1965)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol25/iss2/7

This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Recent Decisions

Constitutional Law - Recidivist Statute As Applied Only To
Prisoners Whose Prior Conviction Had Been In The State Of
Virginia Is Not Unconstitutional. Evans v. Cunningham, 335 F.2d
491 (4th Cir. 1964). Petitioner, an inmate of the Virginia State
Penitentiary, was serving an additional sentence imposed upon him
under Virginia's recidivist statute which provides that if the Director
of the Department of Welfare and institution obtains "knowledge"
that a person confined in the Virginia Penitentiary under a judgment
of conviction had been sentenced to like punishment in the United
States prior to the present sentence, the Director shall give the information to the Circuit Court of Richmond which court has jurisdiction to impose an additional sentence. VA. CODE § 53-296 (1950).
Petitioner contended that the statute, as applied, is not evenhanded
since in practice it applies only to those prisoners whose prior convictions were within the State of Virginia and does not impose such
additional punishment upon prisoners whose prior convictions were
in a state other than Virginia. He contended that the statute was
unconstitutional on the basis that such geographic classification was
arbitrary and deprived him of equal protection of the law.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the statute
merely requires the Director to report knowledge of prior convictions
as it comes to him; it does not impose a duty upon him to seek out
the means to prove the fact of such prior convictions at the recidivist
hearings. Since only the state of Virginia supplies him with usable
evidence in the form of exemplified copies of records of prior convictions, these are the only prior convictions taken into consideration.
The Court of Appeals held that since the basis of the classification is
a matter of practical utility rather than a geographical determination, Virginia's application of the statute is not arbitrary but necessary
and does not, therefore, violate the constitution by depriving petitioner of equal protection of the laws.
There are few decisions dealing with the precise problem of this
case. See Sims v. Cunningham, 203 Va. 347, 124 S.E.2d 221, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962) ; Note, Recidivism and Virginia's "ComeBack" Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 597 (1962); however, the principle
utilized to uphold the constitutionality of the Virginia statute is widely
accepted. In Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 420 (1910),
it was stated that the fourteenth amendment is not to be construed
"as introducing a factitious equality without regard to practical differences that are best met by corresponding differences of treatment." See
ANNOT., 58 A.L.R. 28 (1929); ANNOT., 82 A.L.R. 345 (1933);
ANNOT., 116 A.L.R. 209 (1938); 132 A.L.R. 91 (1941); ANNOT.,
139 A.L.R. 673 (1942). See also State v. Daley, 147 Conn. 506,
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163 A.2d 112, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 887 (1960); People v. Johnson,
412 Il1. 109, 105 N.E.2d 766, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 858 (1952);
Ex Parte Boman, 160 Tex. Crim. 148, 268 S.W.2d 186 (1954).
Maryland has no habitual criminal statute comparable to that of
Virginia, however, several statutes impose greater penalties for second
offenders in relation to particular crimes, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 27,
§ 300 (Supp. 1964) (Narcotics); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 558
(Supp. 1964) (Common thief) and MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 123
(Supp. 1964) (Drunkenness). Although the Maryland Court of
Appeals has not treated the issue raised in the principal case, in
Garrisonv. Superintendent of Md. State Reformatory for Males, 218
Md. 662, 146 A.2d 431 (1959), it held that the;imprisonment of the
accused under sentence as a second offender under the narcotics laws
is not unlawful because of alleged favoritism which had been shown
to others who had been granted conditional commutation of their sentences. See also Torres v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 227 Md. 649,
175 A.2d 594, cert. denied, 369 U.S. 890 (1962).
Corporations - Right Of Stockholder To Recover For Attorney
Fees In Connection With Short Swing Insider's Profits Recovered
By Corporation. Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107
(2d Cir. 1964). Plaintiff attorney was engaged by plaintiff shareholder on a contingent fee basis to discover whether insiders had made
short-swing profits in violation of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958). The attorney
sent a letter to the corporation listing five insiders who had allegedly
made such profits and indicating that the two year statute of limitations would soon bar action upon many of the transactions. Thereafter, the officials of the corporation told the attorney that upon investigation, no violation had been found. Confronted with this negative
attitude and the prospective running of the statute, the attorney drafted
a complaint, which he intended to file upon the expiration of the sixty
day period fixed by the statute for action by the corporation. The
corporation then instituted suit two days before the limitations statute
would have barred many of the actions. The corporation recovered, and
plaintiffs sued for reasonable reimbursement for attorney's fees. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, applying equitable principles, held that
plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable compensation for attorney's fees.
A stockholder who has been successful in maintaining an action
under § 16(b) for a corporation's benefit where the corporation is
unwilling to institute suit is entitled to reimbursement for reasonable
attorney's fees. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1934); Magida v. Continental Can Co.,
176 F. Supp. 781 (S.D. N.Y. 1956). But if a stockholder, even after
considerable effort, presents a claim to the corporation which the
corporation subsequently prosecutes successfully, he is not entitled to
recover attorney's fees. Ibid.; Evans v. Diamond Alkali Co., 315 Pa.
228, 172 Atl. 678 (1934). However, in Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec.
Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. N.Y. 1958), affirming 7 F.R.D. 195
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(E.D. N.Y. 1947), the court held that the stockholder could recover
from the corporation even if action was not commenced by the stockholder. The court stated that the statute was intended to encourage
stockholder vigilance by assuring the stockholder of reimbursement for
expenses of his suit if it produced a benefit to the corporation. The
court, in the principal case, agreed in substance with Dottenheim and
attempted to reconcile this case with the analogous situation of an informer under federal informer statutes where reimbursement for attorney's fees is not allowed in absence of statutory authorization. Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). However, the court, in the principal
case, finding the services rendered to have been more than simple
preparation of a request for the corporation to bring action under
16(b), concluded that it would run counter to the intent of the statute
to deny compensation in this case. The court indicated that there are
certain policy considerations against allowing recovery by a stockholder who volunteers to do what ought to have been done and could
easily have been done by the corporation, considerations which are
stronger when the statute of limitations has many months to run.
These considerations, the court stated, were not present in this case.
See discussion in 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS §§ 1051-55
(2d ed. 1961). See generally: Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics, The
"Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69

(1956);

ANNOT.,

HARV.

L.

REV.

658

40 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1955).

Criminal Law

-

Insanity

-

Burden Of Proof. Bradford v.State,

234 Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150 (1964). The Maryland Court of Appeals
ruled, in the principal case, that the circuit court had erred in excluding
testimony of a psychiatrist to the effect that defendant was unable to
distinguish between right and wrong, and adhere to the right and was
insane under the M'Naghten rule. See Spencer v.State, 69 Md. 28,
13 Atl. 809 (1888); Thomas v.State, 206 Md. 575, 112 A. 2d 913
(1955). Furthermore, the court found this evidence was "sufficient
proof of insanity to raise a doubt in the minds of reasonable men as to
the defendant's sanity," and was therefore sufficient to overcome the
initial presumption of sanity which exists in all cases. Saldiveri v.
State, 217 Md.412, 143 A.2d 70 (1958); Lipscomb v. State, 223 Md.
599, 165 A.2d 918 (1960). Although the question of who has the
burden of proof on the issue of insanity had been raised in previous
cases, the Maryland Court of Appeals had never decided it because
there had been no case prior to Bradford, in which the determination
was necessary to the result and the evidence presented was sufficient to
overcome the initial presumption of sanity. For cases in which the
evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption see Lipscomb v.
State, 223 Md. 599, 165 A.2d 918 (1960) ; Saldiveri v. State, 217 Md.
412, 143 A.2d 70 (1958); Cole v.State, 212 Md. 55, 128 A.2d 437
(1957); Bryant v. State, 207 Md.565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955); Thomas
v. State, 206 Md.575, 112 A.2d 913 (1955). The Court adopted the
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rule that once the initial presumption of sanity has been overcome,
the prosecution must prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The determination as to which party is to bear the burden of
proving insanity depends upon the strength of this initial presumption
of sanity. Under the "reasonable doubt" test, the burden of persuasion
is placed upon the state; the presumption merely relieves the prosecution from introducing proof of defendant's sanity until the defendant
produces evidence tending to show that he was insane. When this
probability has been shown, the state must prove the defendant's sane
guilty mind beyond a reasonable doubt, taking into account all of the
evidence on both sides. States applying the "preponderance of evidence"
test place the burden of proving insanity upon the defendant, i.e., the
presumption of sanity prevails until the contrary is established by the
preponderance of evidence. The extent to which any presumption
should shift the burden of proof must be decided upon considerations
of policy. Courts which accept the latter test generally justify its application by reasoning that insanity may be too easily feigned under the
former test and that proof of defendant's insanity is more readily available to defendant. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 212-40 (1954); Note, The Insanity Defense The Need
for Articulate Goals at the Acquittal Commitment and Release Stages,
112 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 740-41 (1964); WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 30-31 (12th ed. 1932); WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW
§§ 165-67 (2d ed. 1961). In adopting the "reasonable doubt" test,
the Court of Appeals stated it felt this approach was the more logical
and that any problems created by finding persons insane under this
rule were obviated by recent statutory changes which relate confinement for mental illness to danger to the community rather than to legal
guilt. MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, §8(B) (1964 Replacement Vol. 5).
For state by state holdings on this issue see WEIHOFEN, supra at 241.

Domestic Relations - Living "Separate And Apart" Within
The Meaning Of Maryland Divorce Statute. Lillis v. Lillis, 235 Md.
490, 201 A.2d 794 (1964). Plaintiff husband brought suit for divorce
"a vinculo matrimonii" under a Maryland statute providing that "the
court may decree a divorce a vinculo matrimonii in the following
causes . . . fifthly, when the husband and wife shall have voluntarily
lived separate and apart, without any cohabitation for eighteen consecutive months prior to the filing of the bill of complaint. . . ." MD.
CODE ANN. art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1964). During the alleged eighteen
month period, the husband and wife had, on two separate occasions,
occupied the same residence, the first occasion lasting six weeks, and
the second, two weeks; the reason asserted in both instances was
"financial convenience." Both husband and wife testified that on
neither occasion did they have sexual relations. The court held that
these facts did not constitute "a living separate and apart, without any
cohabitation," within the meaning of the statute.
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Although this was a case of first impression in Maryland, the rule
in virtually all jurisdictions with similar statutes is that where the
evidence shows a living under the same roof during any part of the
statutory period, a finding of "a living separate and apart" is precluded. The discontinuance of sexual relations is not adequate to satisfy
the statute, under the theory that the statutes require a separateness of
such a character as to be notorious in the neighborhood. 17 AM. JUR.
Divorce § 185 (1938); ANNOT., 51 A.L.R. 763, 768-69 (1929);
111 A.L.R. 867, 871-72 (1937); ANNOT., 166 A.L.R. 498,
508-09 (1947); See also KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 455,
p. 507 (3d ed. 1946) ; NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT §§ 4.42-.48
ANNOT.,

(2d ed. 1945) ; 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 42(b) (1959). Only the District
of Columbia holds a contrary view. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 89 U.S.
App. D.C. 147, 191 F.2d 344 (1951); Boyce v. Boyce, 80 U.S. App.
D.C. 355, 153 F.2d 229 (1946). In the latter case, it was said "the
essential thing is not separate roofs, but separate lives ....

" However,

the statute involved in these cases does not expressly require that the
parties "live apart" or "live separate and apart". For a listing of state

statutes indicating the nature of separation required in each, see Comment, Divorce on Ground of Separation, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 157,
164 (1961). For a related problem, see Comment, Cohabitation
During Pendency of a Divorce Action, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 243
(1962).

Evidence - Evidence Obtained By Illegal Search And Seizure
Under Nongovernmental Auspices Is Admissible. Sackler v. Sackler,
255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964). In a suit for divorce,
plaintiff husband presented proof of his wife's adultery which had
been obtained by an illegal forcible entry into the wife's home by the
plaintiff and several private investigators. The divorce judgment was
for the plaintiff on a jury's verdict of adultery. The wife sought to
have the illegally seized evidence ruled inadmissible. The wife argued

that prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), in which it was held
as a matter of due process, evidence obtained by a search and seizure

in violation of the fourth admendment is inadmissible in a state court,
all evidence illegally procured had been admissible in New York irrespective of the status of the procurer; therefore, for uniformity's sake

all such evidence should now be excluded. The New York Court of
Appeals, stating that the fourth amendment has nothing to do with
nongovernmental intrusions, held evidence wrongfully obtained by
private individuals may be admitted in civil litigation, in the absence

of constitutional or statutory compulsion for rejection. Judge Van
Voorhis dissented, contending: (1) an officer who acts in violation
of the fourth amendment is considered to be acting ultra vires; his

act cannot be considered as "governmental" but "private," therefore
the amendment should not be restricted as the majority has suggested;
(2) admitting such evidence amounts to a utilization of such evidence
by the court acting as an official branch of the state which would seem
to be contrary to the purpose served by the rule in Mapp; and (3) no
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distinction is made in Mapp between admissibility in civil and criminal
cases. 203 N.E.2d at 484. Dissenting also, Judge Bergan stated that
Mapp had wrought a change in the fundamental view of wrongfully
obtained evidence rendering the rule of admissibility in private civil
cases inconsistent and discriminatory. 203 N.E.2d at 485.
In civil cases, the prevailing rule is that admissibility of evidence
is not affected by the illegality of the means through which the party,
governmental or nongovernmental, has obtained the evidence. Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466-68 (1928); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2183 (3d ed. 1940) (Supp. 1959 and 1964). MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§§ 137-40 (1954). Therefore in the absence of constitutional or
statutory restrictions, evidence which is otherwise admissible will
not be excluded because it has been obtained fraudulently, wrongfully
or illegally. United States v. Lee Hee, 60 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1932);
United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725 (4th Cir.
1958); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 187 (1964); See Martin v. State,
203 Md. 66, 73, 18 A.2d 8 (1953). But see Chambers v. Rosetti,
226 N.Y.S.2d 27, 36 Misc. 2d 779 (1962), holding that evidence
obtained through an illegal search and seizure by a governmental agent
in violation of the constitution, is subject to exclusion in civil cases.
Generally, the exclusionary rule relating to illegally seized evidence,
as announced in Mapp, does not apply where the evidence was procured by an unlawful search made by a private individual acting on
his own initiative. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
ANNOT., 50 A.L.R.2d 531, 570 (1956) and 84 A.L.R.2d 961 (1962)
(both dealing with criminal cases).

